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ABSTRACT
We study the re-arrest rates for two groups: individuals formerly in prison and individuals formerly
under electronic monitoring (EM). We find that the recidivism rate of former prisoners is 22% while
that for those ‘treated’ with electronic monitoring is 13% (40% lower). We convince ourselves that
the estimates are causal using peculiarities of the Argentine setting. For example, we have almost as
much information as the judges have when deciding on the allocation of EM; the program is rationed
to only some offenders; and some institutional features (such as bad prison conditions) convert ideological
differences across judges (to which detainees are randomly matched) into very large differences in
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I. Introduction 
 
Every year a large number of convicted criminals are sent to prison. Given that prisons 
are  expensive  to  build  and  run,  and  often  involve  cruel  treatment  of  fellow  citizens, 
possibly  contributing  to  the  conversion  of  inmates  into  ‗hardened‘  criminals,  it  is 
unsurprising  that  alternatives  to  imprisonment  have  been  tried  out.  One  of  the  more 
intriguing  experiments  in  this  area  is  the  substitution  of  incarceration  for  electronic 
monitoring (EM).
1 ‗Tagging‘, as it is also sometimes called, involves fitting offenders 
with an electronic device (typically on the ankle) that can be monitored remotely by 
employees of a correctional facility who can verify whether the individual is violating a 
set of pre-established conditions. The most common of these  conditions is to stay at 
home, although in some cases a provision for attending work or school is included. By 
2007, more than 250,000 people in the US and Europe alone had been ‗treated‘ with 
electronic monitoring, in spite of the obvious complexity of a full cost-benefit analysis. In 
this paper we seek to contribute to an evaluation of electronic monitoring  (and more 
broadly to the debate about the effectiveness of using prisons) by providing one of the 
estimates  needed  for  such  an  exercise:  the  difference  between  the  recidivism  rate  of 
offenders  formerly  under  electronic  monitoring  and  the  recidivism  rate  for  offenders 
released from a standard prison. 
 
Theoretically, the difference in these two recidivism rates is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
specific deterrence theory suggests that spending time under electronic monitoring rather 
than incarceration might make low punishment salient, implying a positive relationship 
between light punishment (electronic monitoring) and ulterior recidivism. On the other 
hand, several theories point out to a negative relationship. For example, imprisonment 
might be criminogenic through harsh prison conditions or peer effects that are not present 
under electronic monitoring. In particular, electronic monitoring could prevent contact 
with hardened criminals, or reduce the perception that society is ‗mean‘ and ‗deserving of 
the  crime  it  receives‘  (one  variation  is  in  Sherman  and  Strang,  2007).  Moreover, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the discussions in Schwitzgebel (1969), Petersilia (1987), Schmidt and Curtis (1987), 
Morris and Tonry (1990), Tonry (1998), and Payne and Gainey (1998).   3 
electronic monitoring could differ from prison in its effect on the improvement of skills 
(social, applied or cognitive) and labor market prospects.
2  
 
A  simple comparison  of recidivism rates  across  the prison  and electronic monitoring 
samples, however, is typically unlikely to be very informative. There are at least two 
practical empirical problems in trying to derive a causal estimate, one of which can be 
called a problem of selection and the second a problem of differential risk of the target 
population. The problem of selection refers to the fact that, at least one criterion for the 
granting of electronic monitoring to an offender is her/his potential risk of recidivism. 
Thus, low post-release recidivism of a population of offenders treated with electronic 
monitoring could simply reflect the success of the legal system at the selection stage if 
the  objective  was  to  target  ‗kind  types‘  (low  risk  offenders).  The  problem  of  the 
‗differential  risk  of  the  target  population‘  refers  to  the  possibility  that  electronic 
monitoring programs are applied to low risk populations (for example, drunk drivers). 
The failure to detect a negative effect of electronic monitoring on ulterior recidivism 
could simply reflect that this population is at very low risk of crime in general and that 
the control population receives a very light treatment (short prison sentences with good 
prison conditions).  
 
In practice, these and other problems have interfered with the evaluation of electronic 
monitoring.  In  a  recent  review  by  Renzema  and  Mayo-Wilson  (2005)  the  authors 
conclude that “applications of Electronic Monitoring as a tool for reducing crime are not 
supported by existing data.” A similar conclusion is reached in the review by Aos, et al 
(2006),  who  “find  that  the  average  electronic  monitoring  program  does  not  have  a 
statistically significant effect on recidivism rates”.  
 
                                                 
2 Reviewing the vast literature on these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. But many relevant aspects 
are  covered  in  the  recent  review  by  Bushway  and  Paternoster  (2009).  See  also  Nagin  (1998)  on  the 
evidence on deterrence, as well as Sherman and Berk (1984), Smith and Gartin (1989), Stafford and Warr 
(1993) and Piquero and Pogarsy (2002) for discussions of different aspects of deterrence. On peer effects, 
see, for example, Glaeser et al, (1996) and Bayer et al, (2009). An early reference on the correlation 
between cognitive skills and imprisonment is Banister, et al, (1973). Stigmatization following incarceration 
is discussed, for example, in Schwartz and Skolnick (1962).   4 
In this paper we study electronic monitoring in the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
We  measure  recidivism  through  re-arrest  rates  of  offenders  treated  with  electronic 
monitoring since the program‘s inception in the late 1990‘s. As a benchmark, we take a 
group of former prisoners of similar observable characteristics treated with incarceration. 
We find a large, negative and significant correlation between electronic monitoring and 
re-arrest rates. The correlation survives different specifications. 
 
A reasonable interpretation of our estimate is that it is the causal effect of treating an 
apprehended offender with electronic monitoring instead of prison. The main reason is 
that offenders are randomly matched to judges and the likelihood an offender is sent to 
electronic monitoring instead of prison differs substantially across judges. This occurs, in 
part, because of the usual ideological differences across judges, and in part because these 
differences  become  exaggerated  when  liberal-leaning  judges  are  reluctant  to  send 
offenders on pre-trial detention (i.e., who in most cases have not received a final sentence 
in a full trial) to Argentine prisons frequently denounced as too cruel by human rights 
organizations.  Indeed,  some  judges  (often  called  ―garantistas‖  –from  ―individual 
guarantees‖,  which  in  the  US  would  approximately  correspond  to  liberal)  often  send 
offenders to  electronic monitoring whereas  other judges  never do so  (these are  often 
called  ―mano  dura‖  –literally  ―tough  hand‖,  which  in  the  US  would  approximately 
correspond  to  conservative).  The  assignment  of  judges  is  exogenous  to  prisoners‘ 
characteristics: whenever a person is detained by the police, she/he is assigned to the 
judge  who  was  on  duty  on  that  day,  and  duty  turns  are  assigned  by  a  lottery.  With 
extreme ideological differences (and judges behaving like automata who never send an 
offender to prison), the process results in a correlation that can be directly interpreted as 
the causal effect of electronic monitoring on recidivism. Alternatively, it is possible to 
instrument the decision to send an offender to prison or electronic monitoring with  a 
proxy for the judge‘s ideology. This also reveals a negative and significant effect of 
electronic monitoring on later re-arrest rates. 
 
Two other features of this setting contribute to a causal interpretation of our findings. 
First, the judge in charge of allocating EM typically does so without meeting the offender   5 
and  immediately  after  arrest  rather  than  after  a  lengthy  trial.  This  means  that  the 
information available to the judge is very close to the information available to us, so that 
controlling  for  observables  is  likely  to  circumvent  a  substantial  part  of  the  selection 
problem. Second, we can exploit the fact that the EM program is relatively small, with 
capacity to supervise a  maximum  of 300 offenders at  any point in  time.  Thus, even 
without random assignment to judges, those that receive EM are likely to be similar to 
other offenders sent to prison by that same judge. 
 
These institutional features of the Argentine setting also ensure that electronic monitoring 
is applied to offenders that have committed relatively serious crimes, thus addressing the 
problem  of  differentially  low  risk  of  the  target  population.  Note  also  that  electronic 
monitoring in  Argentina  is  associated with the objective of lessening the punishment 
during  the  pre-trial  period.  In  other  words,  the  counterfactual  for  the  group  under 
electronic monitoring is incarceration. This is to be contrasted to the phenomenon of ‗net 
widening‘  in  the  US,  whereby  electronic  monitoring  is  linked  to  an  increased 
punitiveness of the penal system, as it is applied to former prisoners who would have 
otherwise  been  on  lower  supervision  (e.g,  parole  supervision).  Finally,  it  is  worth 
emphasizing  that  EM  in  Argentina  does  not  complement  other  programs  (education, 
work, anger management, drug addiction, alcohol abuse, etc) as a requisite, something 
that facilitates the interpretation of our treatment.
3  
 
Previous work on electronic monitoring using data from the US has been inconclusive. 
For example, Courtright, et al (1997) compares recidivism for drunk driving offenders 
treated with electronic monitoring versus those receiving jail sentences. The recidivism 
rates following release were extremely low for both groups (and the difference was not 
significant). The paper by Gainey, et al (2000) finds some evidence of lower recidivism 
amongst (mostly low risk) offenders who spend time under electronic monitoring, but the 
effect is not robust to the inclusion of control variables. Previous work has found it hard 
                                                 
3  The  evidence  available  from  the  US  and  Europe  typically  refers  to  concomitant  programs,  where 
electronic monitoring is only one of the treatments received (see, for example, Bonta et al, 2000, and the 
description in Gainey et al, 2000). Renzema and Mayo-Wilson (2005) discuss studies focused on groups 
judged to have intermediate and high risk of recidivism, which are still on the low side when compared to 
the groups we study.   6 
to  control  for  the  possibility  that  offenders  treated  with  prison  might  be  particularly 
dangerous and inherently more likely to commit crimes.
4 Renzema and Mayo-Wilson 
(2005) review the literature and find only two studies with random assignment and with 
recidivism  as  the  dependent  variable,  including  Petersilia  and  Turner  (1990). 
Unfortunately they describe several  limitations in  these studies  (including  incomplete 
administration of the program) and conclude that they do not help in the evaluation of 
electronic monitoring.
5 An interesting paper is Marklund and Holmberg (2009), which 
evaluates a Swedish program that allows prisoners to apply to electronic monitoring as a 
substitute for prison (early release) as long as they have an occupation and they subject 
themselves to regular sobriety controls.
6 They find that participation in the electronic 
monitoring program is associated with lower recidivism. 
 
Our  paper  is  also  related  to  work  studying  the  effect  of  incarceration  on  recidivism, 
where  a  similar  selection  problem  is  present  (see,  for  example,  Lerman,  2009  and 
Villettaz, Killias and Zoder, 2006). Two comprehensive reviews by Gendreau, Goggin 
and Cullen (1999) and by Nagin, Cullen and Jonson (2009) conclude that incarceration 
appears to have a null or mildly criminogenic effect on future criminal behavior, but that 
the evidence is not sufficiently strong to be used in policy. Two recent papers by Chen 
and Shapiro (2007) and Kuziemko (2007) pays special attention to selection and reach 
somewhat different conclusions. Chen and Shapiro (2007) exploit the fact that there is a 
discontinuity in the mechanism that assigns prisoners to security levels (and hence prison 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, papers that look at re-arrest rates of people with different lengths of time on electronic 
monitoring (but that are all treated) suffer less from this criticism. The fragility of the results in Gainey, et 
al (2000) is thus particularly disappointing. 
5 It is worth pointing out that the sign of the bias introduced by selection problems depends on the nature of 
the  program.  For  example,  Finn  and  Muirhead-Steves  (2002)  describe  the  application  of  electronic 
monitoring to violent offenders who would otherwise have been released in Georgia, US. It is compared 
with a group of violent offenders who were released and finds no difference in recidivism rates. Given that 
this is a case of net widening, the selection problem has the opposite sign: those selected for continued 
supervision are potentially at a higher risk of recidivism, so the similarity in recidivism rates is consistent 
with positive effects of electronic monitoring. 
6  The  average  age  of  the  electronic  monitoring  group  was  38.  Of  them,  19%  received  help  from  the 
probation service in finding a job, while 28% had arranged participation in a program organized by the 
state  employment  agency,  with  the  rest  having  regular  jobs  that  they  had  organized  themselves.  In 
comparison to the prison population sentenced to a similar term in prison (more than two years), the group 
of successful applicants to the electronic monitoring program contained a smaller proportion of individuals 
with more than a single prior court conviction and/or who had used drugs during their time in prison. They 
were also more often married or had a partner with whom they lived than the prison population.   7 
conditions) in the US. Thus, they are able to observe recidivism rates of former prisoners 
that were ex-ante very similar (i.e., on both ―sides‖ of the cutoffs) and conclude that, if 
anything, harsher prison conditions lead to slightly higher recidivism rates. On the other 
hand, Kuziemko (2007) finds that recidivism falls with time served using two different 
identification strategies. In one, she exploits ―an over-crowding crisis‖ which resulted in 
the release of 900 prisoners on a single day, so that conditional on the original sentence, 
the length of time served for this group was determined by the date the sentence began. 
The  second  is  a  regression-discontinuity  design  using  the  variation  in  time  served 
generated by cut-offs in parole-board guidelines. See also Song and Lieb (1993), Helland 
and Tabarrok (2007), Bhati and Piquero (2008) and Drago, et al (2009).
7 It is also worth 
mentioning  that  one  of  the  identification  strategies  used  here,  based  on  random 
assignment to judges with different ideological inclination, is not new. For example it is 
very much related to the one recently employed by Kling (2006) in his study of the 
effects of incarceration length on employment and earnings. He finds no consistent effect 
using instrumental variables for incarceration length based on randomly assigned judges 
with different sentencing propensities.
8 
 
Section  II  describes  the  implementation  of  electronic  surveillance  in  the  Province  of 
Buenos Aires. Section III describes our data and empirical strategy. Section IV presents 
our main set of results, while Section V provides a discussion that includes the problem 
of escapees. Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. Crime and Electronic Monitoring in Argentina 
 
Crime in Latin America is a major social and economic problem. For example, deaths 
due to  violence in  Latin America is  200% higher than in  North  America and in the 
Western Pacific, 450% higher than in Western Europe, and 30% higher than in the former 
                                                 
7 See also Needels (1996). Iyengar (2010) discusses the difficulties in interpretation of experiments that 
have not been widely communicated to the public. 
8 Other papers studying measures of inter judge variation in sentencing include Waldfogel (1991), Payne 
(1997) and Anderson, et al (1999). Using variation in sentencing across randomly assigned judges, a recent 
paper by Green and Winik (2008) finds similar recidivism rates after incarceration and probation.   8 
communist bloc (Soares and Naritomi, 2010). Our data comes from Argentina, a country 
with  traditionally  low  levels  of  crime  which  has  conformed  to  the  Latin  American 
patterns of high crime rates during the early 1990‘s. Within Argentina, we focus on the 
largest  province,  Buenos  Aires, which  has  been the first  district in  Latin America  to 
implement an electronic surveillance system for the custody of offenders. The Province 
of  Buenos  Aires  is  the  most  significant  economically  and  the  most  populated  of 
Argentina, with a population of almost 15 million people (about 37.9% of the population 
of the country). In 2007, the Penitentiary Service of the Province of Buenos Aires hosted 
a  population  of  approximately  25,170  inmates,  which  represents  41.5%  of  the  total 
imprisoned population of the whole country.
9 
 
The system of electronic monitoring (EM) in the Province of Buenos Aires started in 
December of 1997.
10 At its inception, electronic monitoring was granted to the old and 
terminally ill, with the objective of allowing them to spend their final days with their 
families  and  under  house  arrest.  Soon,  all  new  entries  to  the  electronic  monitoring 
program were detainees awaiting the final sentence (Argentine legislation only allows the 
use of EM as a reduction in the severity of punishment to those awaiting trial). Over time 
the coverage shifted towards individuals under criminal indictment awaiting trial. As far 
as we can tell (from the data presented in this paper and from the interviews with key 
informants), there were no restrictions and any individual accused of any crime qualified 
for the use of electronic monitoring. Given the very slow functioning legal system, this 
period can be substantial and a large proportion of individuals under the supervision of 
                                                 
9 The imprisonment rate of the Province of Buenos Aires (188 per hundred thousand population) is higher 
than the country‘s rate (156). As a reference, consider that this rate for the US is 737, 262 for Chile, 211 for 
Brazil, 198 for Mexico, 193 for Uruguay, 107 for Canada, 85 for France and 93 for Germany. Isla and 
Miguez (2003) provide an account of urban violence in Argentina using ethnographic evidence from low 
income areas, prisons and gangs. 
10  Gomme  (1995)  explains  that  the  first  electronic  monitoring  device  was  developed  by  Harvard 
psychologist Robert Schwitzgebel as a humane and inexpensive alternative to custody. ‗Dr. Schwitzgebel's 
Machine,' as it was called, consisted of a battery pack and a transmitter capable of emitting a signal to a 
receiver within a quarter-mile. In 1977, Judge Jack Love of Albuquerque, New Mexico was inspired by an 
episode  in  the  Spiderman  comic  book  series  to  explore  the  possible  use  of  electronic  monitoring  for 
offenders. Spiderman, the comic book hero, had been tagged with a device that allowed a villain to track 
his every move. Judge Love persuaded an electronics expert, Michael Goss, to design and manufacture a 
monitoring device and in 1983, Love sentenced the first offender to house arrest with electronic monitoring 
(Gomme, 1995). As cited in a The John Howard Society of Alberta, 2000. 
   9 
the penal system are awaiting a definitive sentence. In the province of Buenos Aires, up 
to 85% of detainees were in this category during our sample period. Since its inception, 
and up until April 2007, more than 910 men had been at some point under electronic 
surveillance. 
 
The electronic monitoring system in the province of Buenos Aires consists of a bracelet 
worn in the ankle or wrist of the offender. The bracelet transmits a signal to a receptor 
installed in the inmate‘s house. The receptor has a battery in case there is an electric 
stoppage.  If  the  signal  is  interrupted,  manipulation  is  detected,  or  vital  signs  of  the 
individual are not received, the receptor sends a signal to the service provider through a 
telephone line.
11 The provider tries to investigate the reason for the signal and, whenever 
necessary, reports to the penitentiary system which sends a patrol unit to the inmate‘s 
house.
12 The contractor is the South American representative of a leading international 
provider.  The  fee  paid  by  the  provincial  government  in  May  2007  was  $32 
(approximately U$10) per month. The Buenos Aires Penitentiary Service has a small 
office (employing fewer than 20 employees) that is in charge of the administration.. 
 
An  important  factor  is  how  the  monitoring  surveillance  system  is  allocated.  The 
surveillance program is relatively small, with a capacity of handling a maximum of 300 
detainees  simultaneously.  The process  of allocating  a  bracelet is  as  follows.  When a 
person is arrested, the police must first decide whether to ―convert‖ the apprehension into 
a  detention.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  cases  are  immediately  converted  (for 
example,  because  they  involve  flagrance,  i.e.,  individuals  apprehended  while  they 
commit  crimes)  and  assigned  to  a  State-appointed  defense  attorney,  a  prosecutor  (in 
charge of the investigation) and a judge.  The identity of the judge that will be put in 
                                                 
11 Note that a requirement is that the offender has a telephone, so there could be a problem of selection if 
some offenders do not have access to a telephone. It was explained to us that in practice this does not occur, 
perhaps because of the enormous desirability of EM relative to prison. Obtaining a telephone is relatively 
cheap. We checked with the telephone company, which confirmed that within a maximum of 30 days a 
connection  can  be  obtained  in  the  province  of  Buenos  Aires.  We  also  obtained  census  data  which 
confirmed that a significant fraction of low income people have access to telephone service. For example 
the 2001 census reveals that, within the lowest income group (characterized by having unmet basic needs, 
which accounts for 13% of the population of the province of Buenos Aires), 40% has a telephone. 
12 More modern versions, like the one introduced in Bogota, Colombia, in 2009, perform the monitoring 
globally through a global positioning system (GPS).   10 
charge  varies  depending  on  who  was  on  duty  in  that  district  on  the  day  of  the 
apprehension. One turn on duty lasts for one or two weeks and duty turns are assigned by 
a  lottery.
13  Thus,  the  allocation  of  judges  to  prisoners  is  exogenous  to  prisoners‘ 
characteristics. With the offender under police custody, the prosecutor can ask the judge 
to detain the offender ―preemptively‖ until the trial if he/she represents a flight risk (or 
might endanger/interfere with the investigation).  While it is possible in principle for the 
judge to require more information for her/his decision (and even interview the offender), 
this is extremely rare in practice.
14 At the discretion of the judge, he/she can detain the 
offender at home with electronic monitoring instead of prison.
15 If there are no available 
equipments,  then  the  detainee  is  incorporated  into  a  waiting  list.  The  program  was 
discontinued in  October 2008 after the Fernandez massacre (see below). Our sample 
period ends October 2007 (when we were allowed to start hand collecting the data). 
 
 
III. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
III.a. Data 
Our aim is to compare the effect of electronic monitoring with the effect of imprisonment 
on  criminal  recidivism.  Our  data  were  compiled  from  two  sources  within  the 
administrative records of the Penitentiary Service of the Province of Buenos Aires. The 
first  data  source,  which  was  relatively  easy  to  obtain,  does  not  have  information  on 
recidivism  but  has  data  on  other  characteristics  of  offenders.  For  the  purposes  of 
inclusion in our sample, we first consider all the men that went through the Buenos Aires 
penal system from January 1, 1998 until October 23, 2007. Given that the involvement in 
                                                 
13 A potential problem is that criminals could find out who is the judge on duty on a given day and decide 
their criminal behavior based on that information. In practice, it was explained to us by key informants 
(which included defense lawyers for low income groups) that this never occurs. When asked to suggest 
how this could happen, one informant answered that it could possibly apply to sophisticated criminals –
operating in bands – but that he himself had not heard of it. Note that drug trafficking is a federal offense 
and is not part of our sample. 
14 We have explicitly asked about to several informants. None reported knowing of such a case. A system 
of bail is only used for economic crimes. 
15 It is inadmissible for judges to use the type of crime (or the expected penalty) as a justification for denial 
of electronic monitoring (see the rulings on the Verbitsky case and, in particular, the Diaz Bessone case by 
the Camara de Casacion Penal, ―Diaz Bessone, Ramón Genaro s/recurso de inaplicabilidad de ley' - CNCP 
30/10/2008).   11 
criminal activity declines with age (see for example, Freeman, 1996 and Hansen, 2003), 
we focus on men below 40 years of age (born after January 1, 1957).
16 This first cut 
leaves a sample of 43,618 men. 
 
We then construct two groups. The first group (the electronic monitoring group) is made 
up of individuals whose last period under the supervision of the penal system was spent 
under electronic monitoring. We exclude from this group offenders that are in our sample 
but that died while under electronic monitoring. We also exclude those that were sick and 
those with missing data on the specific type of crime, their birth date, their detention date, 
or their release date. This gives a monitoring surveillance group of 454 individuals.  
 
The second group (the comparison group) is constructed using a similar criterion. It starts 
with the group whose last period under the supervision of the penal system was spent in 
prison.  We then  exclude  offenders  that passed  away, the sick, those characterized as 
dangerous, and those with missing data on the specific type of crime, birth date, detention 
date, or release date. This leaves a sample of 37,378 individuals who were released from 
prisons. Table A shows the pattern of crimes for these two populations. A unique feature 
of the Argentine system is immediately apparent: many of the offenders under electronic 
monitoring are being prosecuted for serious offenses. 
 
Data on recidivism for these individuals is not publicly available and was kept separately. 
When we approached the Buenos Aires Penitentiary Service with our request to access 
this second data source, it was granted (after several requests) under the condition that the 
data was copied by hand (i.e., the files could not leave their premises). This meant that 
copying the information for the full sample with three research assistants was impractical. 
We  note  that  judicial  sentencing  decisions  in  advanced  countries  take  primarily  into 
account criminal history and offense category. In the US, for example, efforts to reduce 
sentencing disparities (which led to sentencing commissions and presumptive sentencing 
guidelines) led to emphasis on these two variables (see, for example, chapter 2 in Morris 
                                                 
16 The average age in our sample is 27. The upper limit on 40 is a compromise between the assumption that 
offending peaks in the mid twenties and the findings of Piquero et al (2001), who show that many more 
offenders are on trajectories that are non-declining in age when incapacitation periods are take into account.   12 
and  Tonry,  1990).  One  example  is  the  sentencing  grid  of  the  Minnesota  sentencing 
guidelines system which gives the presumptive sentence for each offense/criminal history 
combination. Likewise, in their review of the evidence, Nagin, Cullen and Jonson (2009) 
emphasize work that are able to measure a ―minimum set of control variables –age, race, 
sex, prior record and current offense.‖ (see page 148). We note that in the Argentine 
setting, data on even such a minimal set of control variables is theoretically superfluous 
because we are not dealing with sentencing decisions (but rather pre-trial detention). We 
then decided on  the following matching criteria.  For each prisoner  in  the first  group 
(released from electronic monitoring), we identified all those prisoners with similar age 
(+/- 6 months), similar imprisonment date (+/- 6 months), similar imprisonment length 
(+/- 20 percent), same type of crime, same number of episodes of previous imprisonment, 
and with similar judicial status. Finally, from this group (the matching group of prisoners 
identified for each offender under EM), we randomly selected three individuals. Note that 
the features of the pre-trial detention setting and the fact that we can select matches from 
a very large  group of former prisoners means  that we do not  run into the ―curse of 
dimensionality‖  (see  Nagin,  Cullen  and  Jonson,  2009  on  the  practical  problems  in 
previous work that have too many variables to match). 
 
This second source had more detailed information (besides recidivism) which allowed us 
to reconfirm the information we had already collected (in particular, on the intervening 
judge), and correct multiple entries (when individuals re-offending had given slightly 
different  names  on  the  second  entry  into  the  penal  system).  A  small  group  (of  7 
individuals) spent time under electronic monitoring but later went back to prison (because 
of misconduct or because they received a final sentence) and are also excluded.
17 This 
                                                 
17 The reason for their return to prison varies across cases. Note that they may distort our estimates if they 
are particularly ―bad types‖ (as that would generate a selected sample of those in electronic monitoring). 
However,  a  really  ―bad  type‖  would  escape  supervision  altogether  and  avoid  being  re-sent  to  prison. 
Escapees do not pose a problem as they count when they commit new crimes (see the discussion in section 
IV.c. below, where we also report data on the relatively high recidivism rate of escapees in our sample). We 
run some robustness tests including the 7 ―returnees‖ in our sample of electronic monitoring. Even if we 
use the most pessimistic assumptions we find that our main results are not affected. As an illustration note 
that a back of the envelope calculation suggests that if we count all 7 of them and then assume that they all 
recidivate at the rate of the prison sample, the recidivism of the electronic monitoring sample would rise to 
13.4% (from 13.21%). If all of the 7 are assumed to re-offend and get apprehended by the police, then the   13 
procedure gave us complete information for a total database of 1,538 individuals (1,152 
formerly in prison and 386 formerly under electronic monitoring). Note that after this 
detailed information is used as filter the remaining data is no longer exactly matched 3:1 
(2.98:1 instead of 3:1). The second information source also provided data on the number 
and  type  of  visitors  each  individual  had  while  imprisoned  and  a  measure  of  their 
estimated income based on their profession.  
 
III.b. Empirical Strategy 
We  compare  the  recidivism  rate  of  the  electronic  monitoring  and  prison  population 
running the following regression model: 
  
i i i ε α Recidivism    Monitoring Electronic           (1) 
 
where Recidivismi is a dummy variable that indicates whether individual i went back to 
detention in the Province of Buenos Aires after his release; Electronic Monitoringi is a 
dummy  variable  that  indicates  whether  individual  i  was  in  the  electronic  monitoring 
group. We also include in some specifications a set of controls (although note that in the 
basic regressions the sample is matched following age, time since release, detention time, 
previous imprisonment, type of crime and year of release). 
 
An obvious concern with this strategy is that the allocation of electronic monitoring to 
offenders is potentially non-random but instead follows the type of criminal. In particular, 
the concern is that electronic monitoring is assigned to individuals that have a ―kind‖ type 
or that have a lower risk of re-offending following release. We provide several pieces of 
evidence that reasonably suggest that this is not a serious concern in our sample and 
suggest  different  approaches  to  obtain  a causal estimate of the parameter of interest. 
Some of this evidence originates in differences across judges. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rate would rise to 14.8%. Thus, the effect of electronic monitoring would be 7.5 percentage points (instead 
of 9), or a fall in the recidivism rate of 33% (instead of 40%).   14 
Institutional Features of the Argentine Context 
Although  the  Argentine  legal  system  gives  de  jure  less  discretion  to  judges  than  in 
common  law  countries,  de  facto  judges  have  ample  room  to  express  their  views. 
Heterogeneity  in  views  comes  from  a  combination  of  ideology  and  practical 
considerations.  Of  particular  relevance  in  the  case  of  Argentina  is  differences  across 
judges over what to do with individuals accused of crimes before they receive a final 
sentence (whereas  in  the US  judicial ideology  gives rise to  differences in  sentencing 
across judges). Indeed, given the slow rate at which individuals accused of crimes are 
brought to trial and receive a final sentence, a pressing decision for judges is what to do 
with  these  individuals  as  they  enter  the  oversight  of  the  legal  system  and  until  they 
receive a firm sentence, either because they have reached the end of the appeals process 
or  because  they  have  opted  for  not  appealing  their  sentences  (very  few  cases).  Two 
extreme judicial positions have been widely reported in the media: garantistas vs mano 
dura, which, mutatis mutandis, corresponds to the debate in the US between liberal and 
conservative  judges.  A  liberal  judge  (or  garantista)  may  take  the  position  that  in 
Argentina prisons have poor conditions that violate basic human rights and thus, should 
be used very rarely for pre-trial detention.
18 Moreover, individuals that do not have a final 
sentence (for example, because they have appealed their conviction in a lower court) are 
innocent and therefore should be either free or, theoretically, if they are unable to provide 
economic  guarantees  (individually  or  through  a  family  member)  that  they  do  not 
represent a flight risk to the court, then with minimum supervision (because such lack of 
guarantees  are  derived  from  low  socioeconomic  status  rather  than  actions  for  which 
individuals themselves are responsible).  
 
On the other hand, a conservative (or ―mano dura‖) judge, would emphasize the rights of 
victims and their families. They might also consider prisons to be in bad shape, but not 
out of line with other problems in the country. Moreover, he/she may take the position 
that individuals coming before him or her are already likely to be guilty (given that the 
                                                 
18 On overcrowding and prison conditions in the Province of Buenos Aires, see Borda and Pol (2007). See 
―Latin American Prisons: Inhuman Hell on Earth -Rights Violations, Violence are Rampant‖, The Seattle 
Times, February 17, 1997. Katz, et al (2003) show that even in the US, prison conditions can have a large 
effect on behavior.   15 
police is unable to cast a very wide net, it brings to the attention of the legal system only 
cases where there is clear evidence against the detainee). This would explain why the 
system incarcerates the vast majority of those accused of criminal acts, even before they 
have been convicted in their first trial. Interestingly, while in other countries there has 
been an attempt to introduce procedures that harmonize treatment, at least when it comes 
to  sentencing,  so  as  to  remove  the  arbitrary  component  of  the  judge‘s  identity  (for 
example,  sentencing  guidelines  have  been  adopted  to  encourage  consistency  of 
sentencing across judges in the US and the UK), these are absent in Argentina.  
 
This results in an institutional setting where judges have very different criteria when it 
comes  to  assigning  electronic  monitoring.  Liberal  judges  regularly  assign  it,  while 
conservative judges never do so. The rhetoric used is consistent with these differences. 
As  an  illustration  of  the  liberal  position  consider  the  case  of  Eugenio  Zaffaroni,  a 
Supreme Court judge who explains that electronic monitoring violates basic human rights 
and introduces the danger that we could all be monitored in a prison-society, but that it 
should not be denied to individuals detained without a sentence whose only alternative is 
confinement in overcrowded prisons.
19 As another illustration consider Judge Schiavo, 
who stated that ―denying electronic monitoring because a person is ‗dangerous‘ would 
violate the law and the National Constitution‖. Judge Schiavo is noteworthy because he 
assigned  electronic  monitoring  to  a  certain  Angel  Fernandez,  accused  of  illegal 
possession of a handgun, a relatively minor offense. While under electronic monitoring, 
Fernandez killed a family of four (children aged 8 and 10). Fernandez had a prior entry 
into the penal system: in 1987 he had been convicted to 25 years in prison for robbery, 
rape, followed by triple a murder.
20 
 
As an illustration of the conservative position, consider the statement of Judge Ramos 
Padilla when rejecting the pre-trial release of an individual accused of robbery, with 15 
                                                 
19 See ―Electronic Monitoring is today‘s shackle with a Bloody Iron Ball‖, by Eugenio Zaffaroni in Critica, 
October 1
st, 2008.  
20 He had been released after only 15 years because a law at the time mandated that days in prison without a 
final  conviction  count  double.  Schiavo‘s  statement  about  the  inadmissibility  of  using  evidence  on 
―dangerousness‖  at  the  time  of  deciding  on  conditions  of  pre-trial  detention  was  made  to  the  media 
following the Fernandez affair. See, for example, ―Should Judge Schiavo stand trial?‖, by María Helena 
Ripetta, Luciana Geuna and Santiago Casanello, in Critica, October 5
th, 2008.   16 
prior penal convictions: ―I am unwilling to face the accused again if he were in the future 
to be accused of murder during a robbery, and to have to give explanations to the family 
of whomever might be his victim‖.
21 Another illustration comes from simply noting the 
political demands for more punitive judges. A newspaper reported ―Former Argentine 
President Nestor Kirchner followed up the assault initiated by his wife, Cristina Kirchner 
against the Judicial power by stating that it is time for magistrates to ‗put on their long 
trousers‘ and stop ‗liberating and liberating‘ criminals.‖
22 
 
Data on Judges in our Sample 
Besides  the  rhetorical  evidence  on  judge  heterogeneity,  we  can  formally  examine 
differences in pre-trial detention practices across judges. The assignment to electronic 
monitoring or prison by a judge (who happens to be on duty the day of apprehension) 
takes place with a minimum of information, the main one being the type of crime for 
which an individual is accused. If these judges were selecting the ―kindest‖ criminals for 
treatment with electronic monitoring (retribution logic), we would see no person accused 
of homicide in the EM sample.
23 Yet, the anecdotal evidence discussed above suggests 
this  is  not  the  case.  Table  A  shows  that  this  is  not  an  isolated  case.  There  are  36 
individuals accused of homicide who receive electronic monitoring, which constitutes 
7.93% of the EM sample. A t-test comfortably rejects equality to zero. This is relatively 
strong evidence that selection on retribution grounds is not guiding assignment. 
 
Alternatively, if these judges were selecting the criminals with lowest risk of recidivism 
(deterrence  logic)  we  would  expect  to  see  no  person  accused  of  robbery  in  the  EM 
                                                 
21 He then added ―I can‘t make a generalized criticism of colleagues who probably take into account the 
shortcomings of prison institutions, the lack of resources of the judicial system, the excessive work load, 
and the deficiencies in some laws, and then proceed to take responsibility for situations that, at the end of 
the day, correspond to other branches of the State. … each one of the powers of the State must accept its 
responsibilities and judges must act according to the mandate in the preamble of the Constitution, attending 
to  the  concrete  realities  faced  by  the  penal  system…‖.  See  ―Judge  Rejects  Freedom-Pending-trial  and 
criticizes ‗garantista‘ collegues‖, in El Dia, Monday, October 3
rd 2009. 
22 See, for example, ―Néstor Kirchner: It is time for the Judicial System to put on the long trousers‖, in La 
Nación, Thursday, October 30
th 2008. To which Supreme Court judge Eugenio Zaffaroni replied: ―Some 
hypocrites  expect  that  everyone  is  locked  up  and  that  judges  act  as  executioners  of  the  poor  and  the 
excluded. They ask that children are sentenced to jails were they will be raped so that they emerge as 
psychopathic killers‖. In ―Kirchner is badly mistaken‖, Crítica, November 2
nd, 2008. 
23 Note that the ―retribution‖ logic is being applied in a sample of individuals accused but not yet tried in 
court (although given the slow/inefficient legal system, only strong cases are brought forward).   17 
sample.
24  Yet,  Table  A  shows  that  there  are  246  individuals  accused  of  aggravated 
robbery who receive electronic monitoring, which constitutes 54.41 % of the EM sample. 
A  t-test  comfortably  rejects  equality  to  zero.  This  is  relatively  strong  evidence  that 
selection on deterrence grounds is not guiding assignment. 
 
Table A is also informative because it contains the types of crimes committed by the 
prison population.
25 For example, there are 2,687 individuals imprisoned for Homicide, 
which is 7.03% of the sample. For attempted homicide, the number is 545, or 1.55% of 
the sample. Given that these numbers are remarkably close to those in the electronic 
monitoring sample (compare with 7.93% and 1.76% respectively), it is possible that the 
distribution of crimes is similar for the two samples.
26 The hypothesis that judges are 
selecting the ―kind‖ types to send to electronic monitoring requires (at least) that the 
electronic monitoring sample has relatively low frequency for the more serious crimes. 
The evidence suggests that there are no differences in the more serious categories (in fact 
the point estimate is higher for the electronic monitoring sample). It is also possible to 
run a regression of electronic monitoring on the types of crimes (this can be done for the 
full sample of 37,832 offenders). For illustrative purposes, Table B presents the results of 
three simple OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
offender  received  electronic  monitoring  at  some  point  and  0  otherwise.  Column  (1) 
includes  only  a  dummy  equal  to  1  if  the  court  ever  sent  an  offender  to  electronic 
monitoring. The coefficient is positive and highly significant. Column (2) repeats this 
estimation  but  includes  the  indicators  for  the  type  of  crimes  (homicide  is  the  base 
category).  The  shaded  categories  are  crimes  that  are  broadly  similar  in  terms  of 
seriousness  (defined  as  those  categories  for  which  the  Argentine  legislation  provides 
broadly similar penalties). As can be seen, severity of the crime has no predictive power 
                                                 
24 Robbery is the category with highest recidivism rate in our sample. Langan and Levin (2002) report 
recidivism rates in the US, by type of offense. It shows that the percent of released prisoners who, within 3 
years, were re-arrested was highest for property crimes (79% for motor vehicle theft) and lowest for violent 
offenses (under 41% for homicide; no controls for age included). Recidivism rate for robbery was 70.2%. 
The classification used is not identical to that used in Argentina. 
25 Note that drug-trafficking is a federal offense so individuals accused of this crime are not part of our 
sample. 
26  Indeed,  we  test  if  the  distribution  of  crimes  in  the  electronic  monitoring  sample  is  similar  to  the 
distribution of crimes in the prison  sample and we cannot reject equality. This test does not take into 
account the severity of the crimes and weighs equally similarity in any category.   18 
on the allocation of electronic monitoring (more appropriate estimation strategies, such as 
probit estimation, yield similar results). Moreover, the point estimate of Court ever sent 
to EM experiences no significant change when these controls are included (the adjusted R 
squared is 0.01, also unchanged; compare with 0.0005 in column 3). 
 
Further evidence on this issue can be gathered by looking at data on judges. Table C uses 
data on the 199 judges in our sample. Of these, only 101 (or 50.7%) have ever used 
electronic monitoring. Thus, we have evidence that approximately half our sample of 
judges have never used electronic monitoring when it was available to them. This is 
consistent with ideological judges (constrained by the 300 bracelet limit). Of course, this 
could  also  be  considered  a  noisy  indicator  of  the  judge‘s  inclination  to  use  it.  For 
example, some judges might have used it initially by accident or to experiment or under 
an incomplete understanding of its implications, and subsequently decided not to use it. 
Alternatively,  some  judge‘s  that  appear  as  not  having  sent  anyone  to  electronic 
monitoring  might  have  done  so  but  were  unsuccessful  in  obtaining  it  given  that  the 
electronic monitoring program was small. Note in the bottom half of Table B that some 





We present  three  different  ways  of exploiting  the environment  described to  arrive  at 
causal estimates of the effect of electronic monitoring on recidivism. As a baseline note 
that  a  simple  test  of  means  suggest  differences  in  recidivism  between  the  electronic 
monitoring  and  the  prison  population.  The  recidivism  rate  (i.e.,  the  proportion  of 
individuals  released  from  the  penal  system  that  have  returned  for  another  crime)  is 




                                                 
27 The period for which is calculated varies across individuals. On average, 7.1% (10.5%) of those released 
from EM (prison) re-offend and are apprehended within the first year.   19 
IV.a. Selection on Observables 
The first identification approach exploits the fact that the judge allocating EM has to 
make the decision with very little information. Thus, a plausible assumption is that we 
have  available  the  same  amount  of  information  as  the  judge  has  at  the  moment  of 
allocation. Note that the judge is not initially sentencing the offender at a trial where the 
objective is to find out if the accusations are true and where judges might want to find out 
more about the accused. He/she is simply replying to a request by the prosecutor to keep 
a person detained until trial, evaluating only if the offender represents a flight risk (the 
only other criterion is if the offender can interfere with the investigation, and it usually 
plays a minor role). In principle, they could ask to interview the offender. However, we 
are  unaware  that  it  ever  happens.  In  practice,  the  decision  of  the  judge  is  relatively 
straightforward, perhaps because the police only bring forward a relatively small set of 
cases, the vast majority of which involve offenders caught during a criminal act (or, in 
some occasions, very shortly thereafter). Thus, a simple way to address the potential 
selection bias in our estimates is to collect data on the observables available to the judge 
so as to ensure that we make comparisons across similar individuals that only differ in 
their prison experience.
28 Our sample is matched along types of crimes for which the 
offenders  are  being  accused,  which  is  the  main  variable  potentially  affecting  the 
decision.
29 They are also matched for age, imprisonment date, imprisonment length, same 
number of episodes of previous imprisonment, and judicial status. 
 
Column (1) in Table 1A presents an OLS regression between recidivism and a dummy 
indicating if the person was released from electronic monitoring. The coefficient repeats 
the observation that difference between the two groups is 9.01%. Column (2) repeats the 
regression  including  the  above  mentioned  set  of  controls  plus  a  set  of  geographic 
dummies. The coefficient on EM does not change (the sample is matched along these 
controls, with the exception of the geographic information), while those on the types of 
                                                 
28 Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) show that efforts to focus on groups that are similar along 
observable dimensions to the group of interest (for example using propensity scores) can be as effective as 
random assignment. For an interesting discussion on the role of age and criminal history in sentencing, see 
Bushway and Piehl (2007). 
29 Note that, as emphasized by garantista judges (see the excerpts above), using the type of crime as a 
criterion in the allocation of electronic monitoring is unconstitutional (this point was later made explicitly 
in the so-called Diaz Bessone case mentioned above).    20 
crime are consistent with what we expect from other studies (with highly significant, like 
robbery and attempted robbery). Column (3) repeats the exercise with a probit regression. 
The implied marginal effect is again 9 percentage points. Column (4) repeats the exercise 
restricting  the  sample  to  the  most  common  type  of  crime  (Robbery  or  Aggravated 
Robbery), finding similar results. 
 
In  the  first  three  columns  of  Table  1B  we  exploit  some  of  the  added  information 
regarding the prison population. As explained above, the judge does not seem to have 
(and is not supposed to use) this extra information. The approach, however, shows the 
robustness of the results, perhaps allowing comparison with different types of prisoners. 
Two  dimensions  are  explored:  income  (captured  through  the  offender‘s  profession, 
converted into a monetary value using the average income earned by people with these 
professions  in  the  Buenos  Aires  household  survey)  and  family  connections  (spouse, 
number of visits by the spouse, number of visits by the inmate‘s children and number of 
visits by the inmate‘s siblings). The results are extremely similar, though the sample size 
falls due to some missing data.
30  
 
IV.b. Capacity Limits of the Program  
The electronic monitoring program is limited to 300 offenders at any one time. This is 
very small compared to the population in prison. The prison population is approximately 
25,000 detainees, of which approximately 85% are on pre-trial detention and in principle 
could  receive  EM.  Thus,  the  program  covers  only  1.4%  of  the  population  that  can 
theoretically  receive  EM,  with  long  waiting  lists  compiled  by  the  Buenos  Aires 
Penitentiary  system  with  the  requests  of  the  judges.  Offenders  are  placed  on  EM 
following the order in which the requests arrive.
31 Given this, and the institutional setting 
described  above,  a  plausible  assumption  is  that  allocation  of  EM  is  determined  by 
availability  of  one  of  the  bracelets,  which  is  essentially  random.  Note  that  a  causal 
                                                 
30 The small changes in the size of the coefficient can be traced to the changing sample rather than the 
influence of the covariates. 
31 A potential problem is corruption: if some offenders are able to bribe their way to the top of this list our 
estimates  would be biased (though the likely bias is down, as these would presumably be ―high risk‖ 
offenders). Note, however, that after the Fernandez scandal mentioned above, which led to the interruption 
of the program, an investigation of the division in charge of EM of the Buenos Aires penitentiary service 
did not find evidence of misconduct.   21 
interpretation is possible even if matching to judges is non-random (and, for examples, all 
―bad‖ types go to one judge). 
 
Thus, the OLS estimate in column (1) in Table 1A is directly interpretable as causal, now 
not  because  of  successful  selection  on  observables,  but  rather  because  of  random 
allocation (following order of arrival) of limited EM equipment.  
 
Perhaps, one would want to make sure that these judges are indeed sending people to 
EM. In this case we would want to compare those placed on EM with those released from 
prison, but only for the sample that stood before a judge that sent someone to EM. These 
judges were sensitive to the possibility of sending pre-trial detainees to EM. Column (1) 
in Table 2 repeats the base regression (column 2, Table 1A) but restricts the sample to 
offenders detained by courts that sent at least one offender to EM. The results are similar. 
Column (2) in Table 2 conducts a similar exercise but with the full sample and includes a 
dummy if the court ever sent an offender to EM. This dummy variable is insignificant, 
with a point estimate of -0.0035. This is helpful because we now have an estimate of the 
difference in recidivism across former prisoners who stood before the two different types 
of judges (besides those that received EM). The evidence is consistent with no selection 
on the part of judges. The reason is as follows. There are three groups in the sample: 
those that went to electronic monitoring, those that went to prison sentenced by a judge 
that sent someone to EM, and those that were sent to prison by a judge that never sent 
offenders to EM. If the liberal judges were in fact judges selecting the good types (low 
recidivism risks) for treatment with EM, then those that were not selected for EM should 
be bad types (high recidivism). In particular, their average type should be worse than the 
average type of the conservative judges who did zero selection. In other words, the point 
estimate on Court ever uses EM should be positive (as the base category in column 2 is 
those that were sent to prison by judges who never sent anyone to EM). The Table below 
makes the same point using the raw data on recidivism rates.  
 
   22 
Liberal Judges  Conservative Judges 
EM=13.21% (51/386) 
Prison= 22.39% (105/469) 
Prison= 22.11% (151/683) 
 
 
IV.c. Fully Ideological Judges 
Differences across judges in the amount of people sent to EM arise in their ideological 
differences. Given the details of the decision (for example, involving pre-trial detention) 
it is possible that judges that assign EM do so as a matter of principle. Thus, it is possible 
that they act like automata, sending to EM all offenders that come before them. There is 
still the question of why they do not send 100% of offenders to EM, but given the small 
size of the program  (300 at  any one time) this  is  to  be expected.  If this  ―automata‖ 
assumption  is  accepted  then  we  have  a  situation  where  the  assignment  of  electronic 
monitoring is fully determined by the luck of the draw of which judge happened to be on 
duty at the time and place of apprehension. 
 
Thus, the OLS estimate in column (1) in Table 1A is then directly interpretable as causal, 
now not because of successful selection on observables, nor because of the mechanical 
limit on program capacity, but rather because of random allocation across ideologically 
different judges who do not select offenders as a matter of principle.  
 
Perhaps, one would want to restrict the sample to offenders that stood before judges that 
sent at least 10% of their offenders to electronic monitoring. This is the group of judges 
in  our  sample  that  were  most  likely  to  be  ideological  and  to  behave  like  automata, 
sending all offenders to EM instead of prison, regardless of their type. The effect of 
electronic monitoring on recidivism is still negative and significant, with a point estimate 
of -0.12 (results available upon request). Most interesting is the fact that we can reject the 
hypothesis of a lower point estimate relative to column (1) in Table 1A. If judges that 
sent offenders to EM are really selecting, then those in this group (the group that most   23 
frequently sends) should be the least likely to be selecting (with the success or not in 
obtaining electronic monitoring status being determined by availability of the bracelets). 
Therefore, the ideological judges are the most likely to have the smallest difference in 
recidivism between those with EM and those sent to prison. Thus, the point estimate 
should be smaller in absolute value than the one in column (2) in Table 1A (which is the 
opposite of what we observe).  
 
IV.d. Somewhat Ideological Judges 
As mentioned above, some judges might have had a fuzzy understanding of how the 
system worked and its implications so the automata assumption used above is too strong. 
Thus, even if the capacity of the EM program was substantially larger, judges would not 
fully take up all of the available bracelets because they are exercising some discretion. 
This suggests that an instrumental variable strategy can be used using the ideological 
differences across judges in the first stage predicting the decision to send offenders to 
electronic monitoring. 
  
Column (1) in Table 3A uses court dummies as an instrument (the F-stat for their joint 
significance  is  3.96).  There  are  199  judges  in  our  sample,  so  this  approach  has 
limitations. Column (2) in Table 3A uses as instrument the percentage of offenders that 
the court sent to electronic monitoring (excluding the particular offender). We calculate 
this using the full sample with almost 37,832 offenders and restrict attention to courts 
with  more than ten offenders in  the sample (sample size falls  by 25  -to  1,513). The 
coefficient is still negative and significant and somewhat larger in absolute size than the 
OLS estimate. Column (3) explores a small variation of this instrument by including a 
dummy for whether the court ever sent a prisoner to electronic monitoring (which is a 
more flexible approach).  
 
In column (4) we use a different dimension of ideology depending on how early the court 
started using EM. Specifically, the instrument is Court has already sent to EM, a dummy 
which equals 1 if the court has ever previously sent an offender to electronic monitoring,   24 
and equals 0 otherwise. In column (5), we combine the two instruments. In column (6), 
we again combine these two instruments in an IV Probit regression, with similar results.  
 
Table  3B  provides  some  robustness  results,  using  our  base  specification  (the  two 
instruments in all regressions in this table are: the % of inmates of the same court sent to 
electronic monitoring, excluding himself, and a dummy which, for each offender, equals 
1  if  before  himself,  the  court  has  ever  previously  sent  an  offender  to  electronic 
monitoring, and equals 0 otherwise). The covariates used are similar to those explored in 
Table  1B  above.  The  conclusion  that  electronic  monitoring  causes  a  reduction  in 





V. Escape and Discussion 
 
Finally, with a system of (close to) random allocation of electronic monitoring, we should 
expect a considerable amount of escape. Indeed, in our sample 66 individuals (17% of the 
sample) flee by breaking their electronic bracelets and evading from the supervision of 
the penal system altogether. How do escapees affect our main estimate?  
 
First, note that escapees come from the group allocated to EM (there are no registered 
escapes from prison in our sample). When an escapee re-offends and is apprehended, he 
is counted as a recidivist in our sample. In terms of our main estimate this introduces a 
potential problem because the subsample containing the worst types in the electronic 
monitoring  sample  is  the  group  most  likely  to  escape  and  spend  more  time  out  of 
supervision and thus more time to offend again. Indeed, 18 of the 66 who escape are 
apprehended  again,  for  a  recidivism  rate  of  over  27%.  On  this  account,  our  basic 
                                                 
32 For example, rather than a dummy for whether the individual was in electronic monitoring we used the 
proportion of the sentence that was spent under electronic monitoring.   25 
coefficient of interest (e.g, -0.9 in Table 1A) could be an underestimate of the true causal 
effect of treating an offender with EM instead of prison.
33  
 
There is also the possibility of generating rules that might improve the system. Table 4A 
presents the observable characteristics of these escaped offenders. Of them, 19 (almost 
29%) had been imprisoned before (this was at least their second entry into the penal 
system). This is tested more formally in Table 4B where the probability of escape of the 
electronic monitoring sample is estimated against the observables to the judge at the time 
of assignment of EM. We analyze how the variables that were observable to the judge at 
the  time  of  the  allocation  decision  predict  recidivism  or  evasion  from  electronic 
monitoring. The results show that previous imprisonment is a significant predictor of 
both recidivism and evasion. 
 
Although electronic monitoring could be particularly effective in reducing the recidivism 
of  offenders  with  a  previous  criminal  record,  their  evasion  and  recidivism  rates  are 
high.
34  Also  for retribution  reasons,  we might  expect  offenders accused  of homicide, 
attempted  homicide  and  rape  to  be  excluded.  When  we  repeat  the  base  regression 
(column 2 in Table 1A) but limiting the sample to exclude these 4 groups (those with 
previous imprisonment and those accused of homicide, attempted homicide or rape), the 
estimated reduction in recidivism from treatment with  electronic monitoring is still 9 
percentage points (-0.088 with a t-stat of 3.8).  
 
Note that in our study arrest rates are similar for the two samples, with only harshness of 
punishment varying (so differential recidivism cannot be explained by the ―gambler‘s 
fallacy‖ -whereby apprehended offenders think they will have better chances of avoiding 
capture in the future, see Pogarsky and Piquero, 2003 and Clotfelter and Cook, 1993). 
                                                 
33  A  different  potential  problem  concerns  differential  geographic  movements  of  escapees  versus  those 
released from prison. Escapees are theoretically (we don‘t have evidence on this)  less likely to  move 
around the country (or to other countries) as doing so would make them more vulnerable to routine checks 
by the police. 
34 Granting EM to groups with high recidivism or escape rates would certainly be unpopular. Also, we 
could not find evidence that EM is particularly effective in reducing the recidivism rates of offenders with 
prior imprisonment (we could not reject the hypothesis of equal effect of EM across the group with prior 
imprisonment and the rest of the sample; results available upon request).   26 
However, if the electronic monitoring sample has given out more information to the penal 
system  (for  example,  an  address  or  family  contacts)  then  the  electronic  monitoring 
sample would be more likely to be re-arrested, so our correlation is an underestimate of 
the true causal effect.
35  
 
Finally,  it  is  worth  noting  that  several  dimensions  (beyond  recidivism)  matter  when 
society makes these decisions. On the one hand, it is hard to quantify the benefit to 
society of having a more humane penal system, in part because this number will depend 
on the type of beliefs that prevail in society.
36 Even on the fiscal side, precise numbers 
seem  hard  to  calculate,  although  it  is  clear  that  electronic  monitoring  could  be 
considerably cheaper than sending people to prison.
37 Note that given the explosion of 
people in prison in some countries (like the US) fiscal considerations will likely play an 
important role in favoring the adoption of electronic monitoring. As a final example of 
the difficulty in the decision to adopt such a program, note that a proper estimation of the 
deterrent effect of putting people on electronic monitoring instead of prison should take 
into account the possibility that a much larger fraction of the population might be put 
under the supervision of the penal system without building new prisons. In this paper we 





All societies must decide what to do with those that commit crimes. Historically, one 
approach has been to harm individuals guilty of certain crimes. For example, corporal 
punishment, amputation and even death have all been used as part of the penal system 
around the world. The alternative used the most in modern democracies, however, is 
                                                 
35 Our informants from the Penitentiary Service report that this is not the case because, in their opinion, the 
police do not follow up their investigations in that detail. 
36  For  example,  if  people  believe  luck  (rather  than  effort)  pays,  they  will  tend  to  support  lighter 
punishments. See Di Tella and Dubra (2008) for a model and some evidence. 
37 Although simple comparison of costs of prison vs electronic monitoring requires assumptions about the 
activities that will be allowed under electronic monitoring (if work is allowed, even labor taxes and the 
substitution  of  social  services  have  to  be  computed),  and  the  proportion  of  the  total  cost  paid  by  the 
offenders under monitoring (in the US this is often a significant fraction), amongst others.    27 
prison confinement for a fixed period of time. Although some small details may have 
changed, the basic technology used in prisons appears to have remained constant since 
their first descriptions (for example in the Old Testament). This approach has become 
common, leading some to wonder about the possible consequences of using prisons and 
what alternatives might be available to society when dealing with a criminal offender. 
Indeed, at least since Jeremy Bentham, who in 1791 proposed the Panopticon -a glass jail 
where inmates could be watched continually by guards who could not be seen-, society 
has considered how technological and institutional advances could be used to substitute 
for  prisons.  One  of  the  most  intriguing  policy  proposals  in  recent  years  is  to  use 
electronic  bracelets  to  monitor  offenders.  Electronic  monitoring  is  an  increasingly 
popular form of surveillance, with over 250,000 offenders  having passed through the 
system in the US and Europe by 2007. In this paper we seek to contribute to this debate 
by providing an estimate of the effect on recidivism of sentencing a person to time under 
electronic surveillance instead of prison. 
 
Previous  work  on  this  issue  is  inconclusive  (see,  for  example,  Renzema  and  Mayo-
Wilson, 2005). One of the key challenges in answering this question is that, ideally, we 
would like to compare similar individuals after their release from electronic monitoring 
and prison. This is rarely observed in practice because judicial allocation decisions are 
typically heavily influenced by the offenders ―meanness‖ and risk of recidivism. In this 
paper we study the performance of an electronic monitoring program in Argentina, where 
it is  used to  substitute for imprisonment  for detainees  awaiting  final  sentence. Three 
features of the institutional setting we study in Argentina help with a causal interpretation 
of our main estimate. First, judges make the decision before passing the final sentence in 
a  trial,  so  the  amount  of  information  they  have  is  very  limited.  In  most  cases  the 
information available to the judges is similar to the one we have, so a strategy based on 
selection on observables is possible. Second, the capacity of the program is limited to 
only  300  bracelets  at  any  one  time.  Third,  very  bad  prison  conditions  and  the  slow 
working of the legal system mean that even small ideological differences across judges 
can lead to extreme differences in the allocation of electronic monitoring. In fact, liberal 
leaning  judges  have  allocated  electronic  monitoring  to  individuals  accused  of  very   28 
serious  crimes  (for  example  homicide)  and  with  prior  records  of  imprisonment. 
Moreover, they have done so with some regularity, while others have never done it since 
the start of the EM program.  
 
We  find  that  recidivism  rates  among  offenders  under  electronic  monitoring  are  9 
percentage points lower than offenders who went to prison. Since recidivism rates for 
former  prisoners  is  close  to  22.2  percentage  points  on  average,  the  causal  effect  of 
electronic monitoring on recidivism is approximately 40.5%.  
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Figure 1: Panopticon blueprint, by Jeremy Bentham 1791. 
 
A  type  of  prison  that  allowed  prisoners  to  be  monitored  at  all  times 
(without them being aware of when they are being watched). Bentham 
himself described the Panopticon as "a new mode of obtaining power of 













Table A: Type of crime for the electronic monitoring and prison population, 1998-2007 




from Prison  Difference 
   Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent 
Homicide  36  7.93  2,626  7.03  0.90 
Attempted homicide  8  1.76  579  1.55  0.21 
Sexual offenses  13  2.86  899  2.41  0.45 
Other serious crimes  13  2.86  919  2.46  0.40 
Aggravated robbery  247  54.41  18,493  49.48  4.93 
Attempted aggravated robbery  16  3.52  2,571  6.88  -3.36 
Robbery  36  7.93  4,452  11.91  -3.98 
Attempted robbery  29  6.39  2,757  7.38  -0.99 
Possession of Firearms  24  5.29  1,494  4.00  1.29 
Theft / Attempted theft  7  1.54  1,298  3.47  -1.93 
Other minor crimes  25  5.51  1,290  3.45  2.06 
Total  454  100  37,378  100     35 
 
 
Notes:  The  dependent  variable  is  whether  the  offender  received  electronic 
monitoring. OLS regressions. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. Court 
ever sent to EM is a dummy equal to 1 if the court sent at least one offender to EM. 
The base category of crime is Homicide. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 














Table B: Electronic Monitoring Assignment and Type of Crimes 
   1  2  3 
          
Court ever sent to EM  0.02***  0.02***    
   (14.80)  (14.89)    
1-Attempted homicide=1    1.65e-03  1.60e-03 
     (0.33)  (0.02) 
2-Sexual offenses=1    1.63e-03  1.60e-03 
     (0.39)  (0.17) 
3-Other serious crimes=1    2.90e-03  2.90e-03 
     (0.70)  (0.10) 
3- Aggravated robbery=1    4.55E-04  -3.43e-04 
     (0.20)  (0.15) 
3-Attempted aggravated robbery=1    -0.01**  -0.01** 
     (2.40)  (2.44) 
4-Robbery=1    -4.79e-03*  -0.01** 
     (1.80)  (2.07) 
4-Attempted robbery=1    -3.22e-03  -3.20e-03 
     (1.09)  (1.06) 
5- Theft / Attempted theft=1    -0.01  -0.01** 
     (1.59)  (2.22) 
5-Possession of Firearms=1    2.55e-03  2.50e-03 
     (0.73)  (0.65) 
5-Other minor crimes=1    0.01**  0.01 
     (1.99)  (1.50) 
        
 Adjusted R
2  0.01  0.01  5.0e-04 
 Observations  37,832  37,832  37,832   36 
 
 
Table C: Judges 
  
Considering 




Number of judges   199  192 
Number of judges that ever used electronic monitoring  101  64 
% of judges that ever used electronic monitoring  50.70%  33.00% 
% of offenders under electronic monitoring for the  
five judges with highest ratio 
16.60%  25.00% 
22.50%  35.71% 
31.25%  44.44% 
45.45%  50.00% 
80.00%  62.50%   37 
 
Table 1A:  Recidivism  and Electronic Monitoring 
   1  2  3  4 
 Electronic monitoring=1  -0.09***  -0.09***  -0.42***  -0.08*** 
   (4.26)  (4.11)  (3.99)  (2.87) 
 Attempted homicide=1    0.03  0.21   
     (0.49)  (0.62)   
 Other serious crimes=1    0.18**  0.71**   
     (2.31)  (2.14)   
 Sexual offenses=1    -0.02  -0.27   
     (0.41)  (0.61)   
 Aggravated robbery=1    0.03  0.19   
     (0.88)  (1.11)   
 Attempted aggravated robbery=1    1.8e-03  0.07   
     (0.04)  (0.30)   
 Robbery=1    0.05  0.25  0.01 
     (1.09)  (1.18)  (0.34) 
 Attempted robbery=1    0.09  0.40*   
     (1.61)  (1.74)   
 Theft / Attempted theft=1    0.03  0.13   
     (0.41)  (0.29)   
Possession of Firearms=1    0.11*  0.60**   
     (1.88)  (2.12)   
 Other minor crimes=1    0.04  0.21   
     (0.65)  (0.81)   
 Age    -1.9e-04***  -6.8e-04***  -1.7e-04*** 
     (4.05)  (3.09)  (2.72) 
 (Age)
2    7.2e-09***  2.4e-08**  6.4e-09*** 
     (3.34)  (2.29)  (2.26) 
 Argentine=1    -0.05  -0.22  -0.11 
     (0.82)  (0.85)  (1.26) 
 # of previous imprisonment    0.17***  0.67***  0.16*** 
     (7.10)  (7.46)  (5.63) 
 Time under arrest (prison or ME)    7.9e-05  3.7e-04*  1.3e-04 
     (1.34)  (1.74)  (1.38) 
 (Time under arrest (prison or ME))
2    1.6e-08  5.1e-08  -1.3e-08 
     (0.46)  (0.50)  (0.23) 
 Great Buenos Aires    -0.01  -0.03  0.01 
     (0.31)  (0.25)  (0.22) 
 Large city    0.04  0.16  0.08* 
     (1.06)  (1.17)  (1.88) 
 Adjusted R
2  0.01  0.16  0.19  0.15 
Observations  1,538  1,538  1,538  984 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 if the offender went back to prison for a new crime at the Province 
of Buenos Aires. OLS regressions (except probit in column 3). Year dummies indicating the year of release from 
prison  or  electronic  monitoring  included  in  regressions  2-4.  Sample  in  column  4  is  restricted  to  offenders 
prosecuted for Robbery and Aggravated Robbery. Absolute values of robust t (or z) statistics in parenthesis.* 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   38 
 
 
Notes:  OLS Regressions in columns 1 to 5. The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 if the offender went 
back to prison for a new crime at the Province of Buenos Aires. All the regressions include as controls 
type of crime dummies, age, age squared, Argentine, number of previous imprisonment, total time under 
arrest (prison or ME), total time under arrest squared, Great Buenos Aires, large city dummy, and year 
dummies. Columns 4 and 5 are similar to Column 2 of Table 1A, but clustering the standard errors at the 
judicial district and court levels, respectively. Absolute values of robust t statistics are in parentheses. * 
Significant at 10%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table 1B:  Recidivism  and Electronic Monitoring, Robustness 
   1  2  3  4  5 
 Electronic Monitoring=1  -0.11***  -0.09***  -0.11***  -0.09***  -0.09*** 
   (4.17)  (2.86)  (2.85)  (6.35)  (5.06) 
 Spouse visiting      0.06     
       (1.45)     
 Number of children visiting       0.02*     
       (1.93)     
 Number of siblings visiting      -3.1e-03     
       (0.37)     
 Income   2.7e-05         
   (1.12)         
 Spouse     0.04*       
    (1.73)       
           
 Adjusted R
2  0.15  0.15  0.23  0.16  0.16 
Observations  959  1,171  647  1,538  1,538   39 
 
Table 2: Recidivism and Electronic Monitoring 
   1  2 
     
 Electronic monitoring=1  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
   (3.42)  (3.73) 
 Court ever uses EM    -3.5e-03 
     (0.14) 
 Adjusted R
2  0.16  0.16 
 Observations  1,069  1,538 
 
Notes:  OLS Regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 if the 
offender went back to prison for a new crime at the Province of Buenos 
Aires. All the regressions include as controls type of crime dummies, age, 
age  squared,  Argentine,  number  of  previous  imprisonment,  total  time 
under arrest (prison or ME), total time under arrest squared, Great Buenos 
Aires, large city dummy, and year dummies. Column 1 restricts the sample 
to offenders that stood in front of a court that sent at least one offender to 
EM. Court ever uses EM is a dummy equal to one if the court sent at least 
one  offender  to  EM.  Absolute  values  of  robust  t  statistics  are  in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%; *** significant at 1%.   40 
 
Table 3A: Recidivism and Electronic Monitoring, IV Regressions 
   1  2  3  4  5  6 
Second stage:             
Electronic Monitoring=1  -0.08**  -0.13***  -0.12***  -0.12  -0.13***  -0.53** 
  (2.21)  (2.76)  (2.65)  (1.41)  (2.72)  (2.50) 
Adjusted R
2 (second stage)  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16 
             
First stage:             
Set of court dummies  Yes           
              
% Court sent to EM    3.88***  3.13***    3.45***  3.45** 
     (17.59)  (13.69)    (14.64)  (11.44) 
Court ever sent to EM       0.24***       
       (9.62)       
Court has already sent to EM        0.24***  0.12***  0.12*** 
         (10.45)  (4.98)  (4.92) 
 Adjusted R
2 (first stage)  0.30  0.21  0.26  0.11  0.22  0.22 
 Observations  1,538  1,513  1,513  1,513  1,513  1,513 
 
Notes: Instrumental Variables regressions in columns 1 to 5. The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 if the 
offender went back to prison for a new crime at the Province of Buenos Aires. All the regressions include 
as controls type of crime dummies, age, age squared, Argentine, number of previous imprisonment, total 
time under arrest (prison or ME), total time under arrest squared, Great Buenos Aires, large city dummy, 
and year dummies. In the first column, the instruments are a set of dummy variables indicating the court 
that tried the offender. The F-stat of the joint significance test of all the dummies in the first stage is 
3.96***. In column 2, the instrument for each inmate is the % of  offenders of the same court sent to 
electronic monitoring, excluding him. The number of observations in columns 2 through 6 falls from 1,538 
to  1,513  because  we  exclude  courts  with  less  than  ten  offenders.  In  column  3  we  also  include  as  an 
instrument a dummy for whether the court ever sent a prisoner to electronic monitoring. In column 4, the 
instrument is a dummy which, for each inmate, equals 1 if before himself, the court has ever previously 
sent  an  inmate  to  electronic  monitoring,  and  equals  0  otherwise.  In  column  5,  we  combine  the  two 
instruments. In column 6, we again combine these two instruments in an IV Probit regression. All the 
instruments are calculated in the original database of 37,832 offenders. Absolute values of t (or z) statistics 




Table 3B: Recidivism and Electronic Monitoring, Robustness (IV regressions) 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 Electronic Monitoring=1  -0.17**  -0.14**  -0.20**  -0.18  -0.17*  -0.13*  -0.13** 
   (2.92)  (2.21)  (2.31)  (1.66)  (1.86)  (1.80)  (2.36) 
 Spouse visiting      0.04  0.23***       
       (0.75)  (2.19)       
 Number of children visiting       0.02*  0.03       
       (1.80)  (1.61)       
 Number of siblings visiting      -4.8e-03  -1.2e-03       
       (0.58)  (0.33)       
 Income   3.3e-05      -1.4e-05       
   (1.33)      (0.32)       
 Spouse     0.04*    -0.14*       
     (1.70)    (1.55)       
               
 Adjusted R
2   0.14  0.15  0.23  0.23  0.16  0.16  0.16 
 Observations  946  1,155  637  463  1,513  1,513  1,513 
Notes: Instrumental Variables regressions in columns 1 to 7. The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 if the offender went 
back to prison for a new crime at the Province of Buenos Aires. In all columns, the two instruments are: the % of offenders 
of the same court sent to electronic monitoring, excluding himself, and a dummy which, for each inmate, equals 1 if before 
himself, the court has ever previously sent an inmate to electronic monitoring, and equals 0 otherwise. The instruments are 
calculated in the original database of 37,832 offenders. All the regressions include as controls type of crime dummies, age, 
age squared, Argentine, number of previous imprisonment, total time under arrest (prison or ME), total time under arrest 
squared, Great Buenos Aires, large city dummy, and year dummies. Column 5 includes judicial district dummies. Columns 
6 and 7 are similar to Column 5 of Table 2, but clustering the standard errors at the judicial district and court levels, 
respectively. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.   42 
 
Table 4A: Escaped, Crime Categories and the Previously Imprisoned 
  Escaped  Escaped  
(minus those previously imprisoned) 
  Frequency  Percent     
Homicide  5  7.58  4  8.51 
Rape  3  4.55  3  6.38 
Other serious Crimes  3  4.55  3  6.38 
Aggravated Robbery  40  60.61  27  57.45 
Attempted Aggravated Robbery  1  1.52     
Robbery  4  6.06  3  6.38 
Attempted Robbery  4  6.06  3  6.38 
Theft/Attempted Theft  1  1.52  1  2.13 
Other Minor Crimes  1  1.52  1  2.13 
Possession of Firearms  4  6.06  2  4.26 
  66  100  47  100 
   43 
 
Table 4B: Escape and Recidivism within EM 




 Attempted homicide=1  0.06  -0.12 
   (0.49)  (1.67) 
 Other serious crimes=1  -0.08  0.19 
   (1.05)  (1.08) 
 Sexual offenses=1  0.07  0.21 
   (0.61)  (1.28) 
 Aggravated robbery=1  -4.6e-03  -3.3e-03 
   (0.07)  (0.04) 
 Attempted aggravated robbery=1  0.04  -0.09 
   (0.20)  (0.08) 
 Robbery=1  0.22**  -0.03 
   (2.01)  (0.24) 
 Attempted robbery=1  0.02  0.01 
   (0.21)  (0.08) 
 Theft / Attempted theft=1  -0.13  0.11 
   (1.45)  (0.52) 
 Possession of Firearms=1  -0.06  0.06 
   (0.67)  (0.52) 
 Other minor crimes=1  -0.02  -0.10 
   (0.22)  (1.14) 
 Age  -8.9e-05  -6.6e-05 
   (1.08)  (0.69) 
 (Age)
2  3.1e-09  1.9e-09 
   (0.83)  (0.43) 
 Argentine=1  0.20**  0.11 
   (2.50)  (1.19) 
 # of previous imprisonment  0.14***  0.15*** 
   (2.91)  (3.08) 
 Great Buenos Aires  0.06  0.03 
   (1.45)  (0.70) 
 Large city  0.26***  0.08 
   (2.50)  (0.76) 
 Adjusted R
2  0.09  0.03 
 Observations  386  386 
Notes: OLS Regressions. The dependent variable in column 1 is a dummy = 1 if 
the offender went back to prison for a new crime at the Province of Buenos 
Aires after release. The dependent variable in column 2 is whether the offender 
escaped from the electronic monitoring system. In both regressions, we restrict 
attention to offenders that received electronic monitoring.  Absolute values of 
robust t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.  